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One can hardly assess properly the political decisions with respect to
immigration in the early 1990s without taking into account the widespread
anxiety about a migration deluge in the climate of the general migration-phobia
in Europe at large and in Germany as the most conspicuous case in point. Soon
after the wall came down in early November 1989 and after the dramatic geo-
political landslide changes that the breakdown of the iron-curtain entailed, the
threat of migration did not only appear as a nightmare to the Germans but also
to Europe at large, after the Italian port of Bari was besieged by Albanian ships
with ten thousands of refugees, after asylum applications soared throughout
Europe at large and in Germany in particular.
2
Given rather defensive attitude of European countries towards immigration
throughout the 1980s, the refugee door had become an increasingly important
entry gate into the EC from the outside. The asylum systems throughout Europe
got under strain from the constant growth in the numbers of people seeking
asylum the number of asylum-seekers rose from 14,000 in 1973 to 71,000 in
1983 and to 575,000 in 1991. The rising tide of the number of asylants were
perceived of being a severe drain on taxpayers' money. The estimated costs of
processing the asylum applications and providing care to the applicants amount
to about US$ 7 billion in Europe in 1991.
3
In the Germany there was a general ,,the boat-is-full attitude" towards the
immigration of foreigners in the political arena and in society at as well as the
anxiety about dramatic inflows from East Germans. Even those who used to
have a perception of immigration as being a positive-sum game would have
acknowledged that too much of a good thing at a time may finally turn it into a
bad. It was a kind of common sense that a sudden "migration of nations" would
probably exceed the absorptive capacity of the member countries of the EC.
with Germany being the country under dual immigration pressure.
1 This contribution draws heavily on Paquc. Soltwedel el al. (1993) and Soltwcdcl (1993).
2 In the first months of 1998, Italian ports again served as entry ports to Europe for ships
packed with Kurdish refugees from Turkey who were heading mainly for Germany, too.
3 For details sec Widgren (199.1).Apparently, to many people in South Korea mass immigration from the north
is likewise more of a threat than a blessing. And against the background of the
size of the North Korean population,
4 the traumatic decline in economic activity
in North Korea and the tremendous differential in per-capita-income between
the two Koreas - which is by far bigger than the differential between East and
West Germany - widespread anxiety about a deluge of migration seems
warranted.
My paper is organized as follows: Some theoretical considerations on the
driving forces of migration are presented in Section II. I will briefly sketch out
the German perspective of immigration policy in Section III. Section IV
explains that the threat of migration after unification prepared the ground for a
wage explosion in East Germany. Section V will - against this background -
report on the pattern of east-west migration in Germany. Section VI tries to
draw cautious tentative conclusions whether the threat of migration be
contained in a unified Korea.
II. Some theoretical considerations
The migration calculus takes not only the starting conditions (standard of living
differentials) and the cost of migration into account but likewise the expected
future development over time.^ Hence even a severe differential in real per
capita income may be consistent with the decision to stay on when the
expectation is justified that (i) the standard of living in the home country is
improving and (ii) catching up with the destination country. The costs of
migration may increase with rising labor market difficulties in the destination
country. However, models in the tradition of the Harris-Todaro type explaining
rural urban migration hint at the positive present value of queuing in the slums
around the urban areas. There are mainly two reasons for that: (i) the probability
of getting a job (in the official or black economy) may be quite high despite a
relatively high average rate of unemployment, if turnover is high, (ii) Being
4 Whereas the North Korean population is about half the size of the South Korean
population, East Germany was just sixteen percent of the West German population.
' For an analysis of the microeconomic calculus in migration see Stark (1991). For a short
description of an analytical framework for international migration see Siebert (1993).3
poor in the environment where the rich live is in general more convenient (not
least because of the higher level in the provision of public goods) that staying in
the cluster of masses of the poor.'Hence the expectation about the probability of
convergence in real income and about the timepath of convergence are crucial
for the decision-making process whether to stay on or move.
Basic trade theory suggests that trade can help in this respect: let the goods
migrate instead of people/
1 The well-known story is that countries tend to
export commodities that use intensively the factors in which they are well
endowed, while they tend to import commodities that use intensively the factors
in which they are poorly endowed. Just consider the case that transactions costs
are drastically reduced by, say. generic innovations in the transportation
technology or by moving from autarchy or protection to more freedom in the
trade regime: prices of traded commodities tend to equalize. Countries will now
export more of the goods that exploit their favorable factor endowment. The
demand for the abundant and cheap factor booms, while that lor the scarce and
expensive factor slumps. Thus, commodity price equalization tends to produce
factor-price equalization, although theory is ambiguous about how much. E.g.
Hatton and Williamson (1994) show that commodity price equalization played a
significant role in contributing to real wage convergence up lo 1985, and in
muting the divergence effects of superior American industrialization thereafter.
In an analysis of the interrelations between the transformation processes in
Central and Eastern Europe and emigration from these countries. Krueger
(1994) hints at the experiences of other middle-income countries and sees the
possibility for the transformation countries to raise their pet-capita incomes by
5-7 percent per annum over the next decade, if they adopt outer-oriented
policies. A prerequisite for such an outcome is. of course, that Western
European countries open their markets to exports of these countries and
enhance their investments in these countries.7
6 For the following sec Hatton and Williamson (1994).
7 Sec Krueger (1994). Wyplosz adds, in the same volume, that adequate reforms carried out
in the sending countries will foster capital accumulation, offering the prospects of better
conditions with markedly rising incomes. This would contribute to the slowdown of
migration (Wyplosz 1994: 173-191).4
III. The German perception of,,non-immigration policy"
8
Despite official denials, West Germany has been an immigration country ever
since the beginning of the 1950s and even in a historical perspective. The
relative size of the inflow of migrants is comparable to the immigration into the
United States at the beginning of this century. Altogether about 26 million
people moved to West Germany from 1950 to 1989.
9 The leitmotiv of German
guestworker policy, the rotation principle, which means economically that
foreign workers figure as a "buffer stock" to alleviate temporary labour
shortages, has proven to be a mirage, in particular since the (Europe-wide)
recruitment stop for non-EC labour in 1973: guestworkers have come to stay. In
1987, about 60 per cent of the foreign population was already living in West
Germany for more than ten years. This is a kind of paradox: the largest part of
the "guestworker population" is staying in a close to permanent immigration
situation in a non-immigration country where the jus sanguinis does in general
not allow them to become German even if they married a native German citizen;
furthermore, naturalization is very costly.
Immigration into Germany has in the 1980s been fed from four sources
(Table 1): (i) inflow from the former GDR ("Ubersiedler"); (ii) inflow of ethnic
Germans from the former socialist countries ("Aussiedler"); (iii) asylum
seekers
10; and (iv) conventional immigrants (e.g. in the course of family re-
unification; on the basis of work permits; from EC countries).
1' In 1989, there
8 For a stylized description and assessment of immigration policies in Germany an other
industrialized countries see Zimmenrmann (1994: 227-258).
9 Ibid.: 249.
1
0 The inflow of foreigners (gross as well as net) has been subject to strong cyclical
fluctuations, in line with the pattern of the German business cycle. There has been a surge
of asylum applications — from 57,000 in 1987 to 438,000 in 1992. For these applications,
the approval rate declined substantially from an already low 11 per cent in 1987 further
down to 6 percent in 1991. Many of those who have not been granted asylum according to
the German asylum law cannot be returned because of the 1951 Geneva UN Convention
and on humanitarian or other grounds; this has been the case for about 57 per cent of
disapproved applicants in 1989. Returning disapproved asylum applicants to their home
countries is a cumbersome process, not least because it requires acceptance of these
countries. Only about 3 per cent of asylum seekers are actually relumed. In 1991, roughly
one million refugees was staying in Germany.
1' In the longer run, the "homines migrantes" will mainly come from Turkey, a country
which has traditionally close links to Germany. The Turkish labour potential, measured aswas a net flow of immigration of roughly one million people (1.6 per cent of
total population in West Germany), in 1990 of about 900.000. Two thirds of the
net immigration flows in 1989 and 1990 — being ethnic Germans — were entit-
led to receive a German passport. The number of the "Aussiedler" declined
considerably from about 400.000 (1990) to 220,000 (1991). This decline was
mainly due to a more cumbersome queuing procedure and special efforts to give
the ethnic Germans an incentive to stay in the countries where lived so far. To
be sure, most of the "Aussiedler" are as alien to Germany as the immigrating
non-German population, with hardly any command of the German language and
no up-to-date knowledge about the country and the society itself. To a large
extent, the "Aussiedler" are also regarded as foreigners by the incumbent
German population, and not welcomed with more enthusiasm than non-
Germans.
The surge of asylum seekers is perceived as a severe matter of concern for the
public at large, in particular because the processing of applications and
providing accommodation is costly: the federal government estimates that these
costs amounted to DM 6.4 billion for the federal, state and municipal purse in
1991 — as compared, for example, with a public budget on development aid of




Not only Germany but Europe as a whole will be unable to effectively control
the entry of low-skilled and illegal immigrants. Hence, the informal sector will
expand, with more competition between immigrants leading to an enhanced
labour market segmentation, but also to a more de-facto deregulation of labour
markets. Nevertheless, even in those cases where immigrants will be living on
the fringe, they will be regarded as being better off than if they had stayed at
the size of the population in the 15-64 age bracket, is rising from 34 million in 1991 to 42
million people in 2000 (United Nation 1991).
'2 Bundesministerium des Inncm (1992). Since July 1991, asylum seekers are entitled to
work, but only under some quite restrictive conditions such as the lack of an adequate
German or EC citizen to fill the particular vacancy in question, and a highly constrained
regional mobility. After changing the constitutional provisicon for the acceptance of
asylants into a by far more restrictive policy stance (countries arc separated according to
their ..safeness" with regard to the risks of an asylant to be prosecuted, tortured or even run
a deadly risk if being relumed in 1994. the inflow of asylants declined dramatically.
Nowadays there is hardly a subslabtial asylant problem that is exiting to the general public
or to the public coffers.home, which will sustain the momentum of immigration.
At present, the empirical assessment about the effects of migration is still
rather controversial, with opponents dominating the political arena and the
general public discussion; it seems to be mainstream thinking that immigrants
take more from the public purse than they add to it. However, recent research
shows that foreigners have been an asset for the German public coffers not only
in the last four decades, but also in the most recent past, although the positive
contribution of immigration might diminish in the future as the labour force par-
ticipation rate of foreigners is now close to the one of Germans, and their
average unemployment rate even higher; but they still have a lower average
income than Germans and — most important of all — they have a "better" age
structure with a higher share of young people, which helps to widen future fi-
nancial bottlenecks of the social security system.
As to further pros, immigration has helped easing labour market tensions and
foreign workers tend to foster the upward mobility of the native work force.
Hardly anybody in 1948 Germany did believe that it would be possible to
quickly integrate about 10 million refugees. Furthermore hardly anybody in the
early 1980s did believe that macroeconomic wage moderation for a couple of
years helped supply about 1.4 million new jobs that allowed the relatively
smooth integration of a great number of immigrants from Central and Eastern
Europe. In addition, revealed preferences of consumers indicate their ap-
preciation for the increased variety in the supply of services (e.g. in catering),
and the somewhat more colourful cultural environment.
As to cons, it is maintained that migrants take jobs away from native
workers;
1
3 that there is anti-social behaviour by immigrants, such as welfare
dependency or crime, unwillingness to integrate; tensions in housing markets
would be harnessed; bottlenecks in urban infrastructure worsen; educational
standards might suffer; the stability of the labour market in general and wages
in particular is endangered. Strain on the public purse that discourages
appeasing hand-outs to native citizens spurs envy, exclusion and marginali-
zation of refugees in particular and foreigners in general. Immigration is largely
perceived as a negative-sum game and, hence, further immigration seems to be
Pischke and Veiling (1997) show that there is little evidence for displacement effects due
to immigration.unsustainable.
1
4 On that basis, there was widespread acceptance that the liberal
asylum provisions in the Basic Law of Germany was made more restrictive in
the mid of the 1990s, that the queuing procedure for ethnic Germans were made
more cumbersome and that financial assistance was provided for neighbouring
countries in the east (Poland, Hungary. Czech Republic) to improve border
controls. Hence, to some extent the threat of migration would be dampened by
legal and administrative means.
IV. Unification and the Threat of Migration: The Recipe for
Wage Explosion
The German Government has not undertaken any effort at all to (physically or
legally) prevent East Germans from migrating to West Germany. To prevent
people from migrating to the west, the government had to credibly commit itself
to an economic policy that stabilized the expectation of a swiftly rising real
income. Hence, the West German government decided to heavily invest into the
public infrastructure in the new federal states. The political argument was to
avoid an economic devastation of East Germany. Economically, the investment
into public infrastructure was justified because the overall economic returns
(public and private value added) to investment presumably have been and are
significantly higher than in the West given the desperately bad condition of
infrastructure capital in the former GDR. However, the productivity effects
would be felt only over the medium trem. Thise of investment could hardly
meet the zeal of the East German populations for a quick catching-up process in
1
4 It is important to note, however, that in many instances the perceived costs of immigration
are not directly caused — though possibly accentuated — by immigration itself. Many of
the time-honoured and broadly accepted domestic policies in these areas arc by themselves
largely inefficient or even ineffective. In any event, they represent a major drain on
taxpayers' money, and would deserve a profound reconsideration anyway. Immigration
pressures may give additional reason to rethink housing policies, instead of taking recourse
to closing the borders for the inflow of people: a deregulation of the housing market which
may spur a regional deconcentration of economic activity would likewise be a comple-
mentary policy response which could be advocated on its own merits. And it is highly
questionable whether every part of labour market regulation and the pay structure is appro-
priate and sustainable anyway. In all these instances, potential migration could be just
another incentive for pursuing the appropriate kind of economic policies.real income, i.e. in wages. Hence this put the heat on wage policy as a means to
cushion the incentives to migrate.
Compared to the endowment with physical capital, East Germany was labor
rich. According to theory, East Germany was to offer a labor cost advantage in
order to catch up rapidly with West Germany and other countries, in order to
avoid unemployment and to attract outside private capital. However, relative
factor prices did not comply with the economic rationale; the consequence was
a skyrocketing increase in unit labor costs and concomitant unemployment.
Wage explosion became the core of the German unification problems.
There was a severe principal-agent problem in wage policy in the last months
of the existence of the GDR, in fact, there were no principals at all. This was
partly due to the break down of the old political system; on the company level,
wage increases were not resisted, as the director generals wished to attain the
support of the work force under the new political conditions. Hence, the
companies had a soft budget constraint; the government as the factual owner of
the companies had to come up for all companies losses, but could not control
the companies. With its guarantee to convert wages at a rate of 1:1 the
government of West Germany at least had nourished the illusion, that wage
increases would have no consequences, and this the more so as, according to the
unification treaty, the Federal West German government was to become the
owner of the state owned companies in East Germany. In the average of the
second quarter of 1990, monthly wages and salaries per employee were 20 p.c.
higher than in the fourth quarter of 1989 and 26 p.c. than in the third.
1
5
Immediately after the introduction of the DM, collective wage bargaining
rounds took place in East Germany without solving the principal-agent problem.
In the bargaining rounds, East German employers (in the sense of employers of
privately owned companies) did not exist; instead the director generals of the
old industrial combines of the (previous) GDR played this role.
1
6 Very often,
representatives of West German employers associations took the part of the
1
5 Schatz and Schmidt (1992: 374).
1
6 As a matter of fact, the combines had come under administration of the Treuhandanstalt, a
holding of publicly owned companies (see below). The Treuhandanstalt, however, was not
the owner of the companies and could not take the employers part in the bargaining
rounds.employers in the bargaining rounds in East Germany.
1
7 These employers did
not represent the later owners of the companies which were to be privatized nor
the owners of companies which would be newly established; they did not have
to bear the economic consequences from the bargaining agreements. The trade
unions, dominated by West German trade union leaders, followed in East
Germany the same strategy of ..equal pay for equal labor" as they used to do in
West Germany, neglecting productivity differences between regions, branches,




The trade unions achieved wage increases for the second half of 1990 of
between 25 % and 60 % from the level at which wages had been converted from
Mark East to DM on the first of July.
1
9 In the remainder of the year, contracts
for 1991 were bargained, generally providing an increase of wages in East
Germany to from 55 % to 60 % of the West German wage level, and further
rapid adjustments to the Western level in the subsequent years.20 Wages and
wage increases completely decoupled from productivity and productivity
increases. Industrial decline in East Germany was harnessed (table 3) and
unemployment exploded together with the explosion of wages (table 4). Since
1989, employment in East Germany has been reduced by 35 p.c. However,
compared to West Germany (and other industrialized countries) labor force
participation rates have been extremely high in East Germany, above all the rate
of women (table 5). The introduction of the West German collective bargaining
system with its ,,cozy corporatism" (Paque) turned out to be extremely harmful
for East Germany and for unified Germany as a whole.
1
7 It has often been discussed whether the representatives from the West German employers
associations have not been reluctant to resist the rapid wage increases in the East because
actual and potential competition for companies in West Germany was reduced.
'8 For a comparison of the detrimental role of Irade unions in Southern Italy and in East
Germany see Boltho, Carlin and Scaramozzino (1997).
1
9 One argument put forward to justify the wage increases was that otherwise people would
migrate to West Germany. However, the increase in unemployment which was enforced by
the wage increases in turn was reason to migrate to West Germany. Evidence from West
Germany exhibits in addition, that despite significant wage differences people do not
migrate often as long as they have a job in their home region.
2
0 Sec: Geschaflsbericht der Deutschen Bundesbank fur das Jahr 1990 (Annual report of the
Deutsche Bundesbank for the Year 1990: 23).10
The transfer of West Germany's welfare state provisions and social insurance
systems intensified moral hazard in wage policy. It was the West German tax
payer and those contributing to the social insurance system who had to bear the
brunt of the economic costs of the wage increases: (i) Most of East German
companies became the property of the German government, which had to cover
company losses, (ii) With no capital stock based on previous contributions from
East Germans to tap on the increase of unemployment in East Germany
translated into West German contributors paying for unemployment benefits in
East Germany. Hence, there was no effective brake against moral hazard in
collective bargaining. Furthermore, there was a broadly based political approval
for a very rapid equalization of wages between the west and the east despite the
vast (and increasingly obvious) labor productivity differential. In any case,
under the given institutional conditions and the incentives they implied it was
the West German tax payer or and those from West Germany contributing to the
social insurance system who had to come up for the wage increases and for the
costs resulting from them. Thus, the trade unions in East Germany did not need
to care much for the consequences of the wage cost explosion. In essence, East
Germany turned out to be a high cost location with unit labor costs exceeding
the level of West Germany considerably, even seven years after unification
(table 2).
The tremendous appreciation in the sequel of the introduction of the D-Mark
provided the final blow to the manufacturing sector's competitiveness.
Production fell rapidly in the later course of the first half of 1990 and continued
to do so in the second. Within one year following the economic, social and
monetary union in 1990, in East Germany industrial production dropped to one
third of its 1989 volume, and GDP by one quarter
21. A massive
deindustrialization took place which, in terms of intensity, was unique among
the transformation countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Hence, East
Germany's manufacturing sector had to be rebuilt mostly from scratch.
2
2
The federal governments policy with regard to getting East Germany's
economy off the ground officially rested on two pillars: (i) The improvement of
the infrastructure in East Germany by federal programs; e. g., in the years 1991
2
1 Schatz and Schmidt, op. cit.: 374.
2
2 Gerling and Schmidt (1997).11
to 1996 roughly 125 Bill. DM or 11 p.c. of all gross transfers to East Germany
have been spent on improving roads, highways, the inland shipping system or
the railway system, (ii) The compensation of disadvantages for companies in
East Germany compared to companies in West Germany because of the poor
infrastructure endowment (and other heritage from socialism, e.g.
environmental pollution).
Early in 1991 in view of the general decline in the new federal states the
Federal government decided to grant massive support to the revitalization of the
East German economy. Initially, the basic approach was against subsidies for
the maintenance of the old companies and old industries and in favor of
restructuring and of establishing new companies and industries. However,
restructuring turned out to do just this: modernize old factories and industries at
a high cost often under the pressure of politicians in the new federal state, the
trade unions and the work force. The programs aiming at building up of the
economy have been supplemented by comprehensive financial transfers for
labor market policy purposes and for general social policy purposes.
2^
According to the federal government's own calculations gross public sector
payments as well as net payments have peaked in 1993, when they hit the record
level of 215 Bill. DM and 172 Bill. DM respectively or 7.5 p.c. and 6.0 p.c. of
the west German GDP.
2
4 According to the budget plans the transfers to East
Germany were 200 Bill. DM gross and 144 Bill. DM net in 1996. In the years
1991 to 1996 together the payments have made up for 1.175 Bill. DM gross and
905 Bill. DM net. Most observers would agree that the larger amount of
transfers was not for public infrastructure investment or to induce private
investment.
The East German economy is, at the late 1990s, still far away from developing
growth dynamics of its own, and the increase of the living standard of the
population has rested to a large degree on the public transfers from West
Germany. This becomes particularly clear from the observation that final
domestic demand (or use of resources) exceeds GDP significantly. Internal
2
3 Various estimates on the net transfers to East Germany mainly differ because of the
counting of transfers. E.g.. it could be argued that certain payments of the federal
government for the construction of roads should not be treated as transfers as such
payments to west German federal states are not counted as transfer cither.
2
4 Bundesministenum fur Wirtschaft (1996; mimeo).12
production of East Germany made up for only 63 p.c. of internal final demand,
and the share of private consumption in GDP was 74 p.c. (compared to roughly
50 p.c. in West Germany)
25. The gap between domestic demand and domestic
production is still being closed by public transfers to East Germany and by
private capital flows.
To give momentum to economic growth and to reduce the difference in
productivity against West Germany investment must expand significantly faster.
Investment by private companies has been comprehensive in East Germany; the
share of private investment in east German GDP can be estimated to have risen
from 36 p.c. in 1991 to 44 p.c. in 1995.
2
6 As a matterof fact, due to private and
public investment the capital stock in East Germany has increased markedly,
though still lagging substantially behind (per capita) capital endowment in West
Germany. More private investment requires that its profitability is improved.
Numerous company polls in East Germany have revealed that too high and too
fast rising wages are the most important obstacle to competitiveness and to
profitability
27. E.g. 61 p.c. of a very large number of companies which have
answered the questionnaire for the most recent report of three German economic
research institutes rank wage costs to be the outstanding problem
28. They are
the most important impediment for the reduction of unemployment in the new
federal states, too.
Times and again the government has been urged to pay wage subsidies to
companies in East Germany in order to reduce the labor costs for them and to
contribute thereby to the reduction of unemployment
29. Such subsidies,
however, would mean that failures of the employers associations and the trade
unions are sanctioned ex post, and they could even induce further wage
25 Because of increasing statistical difficulties, which could not be overcome, in the national
accounts statistics separate figures for East and for West Germany on the expenditure side
are not published beginning 1995..
2
6 Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft an der
University Kiel, Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, op. cit.: table Al 1.
2
7 See on this issue also: Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung (Counsel of Economic Advisers) (1991: 196-200; 1996: 184).
2
8 ibid, table A3.
2






In recent years, though, more and more firms in East German manufacturing
realize that they would face immediate bankruptcy if they would obey to the
collective agreements. They are trying to get out of the cost enhancing
collective bargaining system.
3
1 Many East German employers agree with their
work force on lower wages, longer working hours and others. In autumn 1996.
42 p.c. of companies paid wages below contract wages compared to 33 p.c. in
1995
32. In particular, the smaller and the newly established private enterprises
escape the collective bargaining agreements in this way. In as far as the
companies are members of employers associations and the workers members of
trade unions, agreeing on the company level on pay below the wages settled in
the bargaining agreements is illegal. However, neither the trade unions nor the
employers associations or the government dare to insist on the bargaining
contracts; for, in many cases, the result would be immediate bankruptcy of most
of the companies concerned.
V. The pattern of east-west migration in Germany
Because all East Germans had the constitutional right to receive full citizenship
upon arrival in West Germany anxiety of mass migration that would add to the
already high immigration from other sources was prevalent. The GDR citizens
did know about the wealth gap between the east and the west from watching
TV, from direct testimony from pensioneers who were entitled to travel to the
3
0 In order to prevent further aggressive wage increases, wage subsidies would have to be
conditioned. The open question, however is, whether the government has sanctions, which
can be applied in case that the conditions are hurted, and whether the government applies
the sanctions.
3
1 It is important to note that since the mid-1990s, manufacturing firms in East Germany are
increasingly escaping the rigid legal norms of collective bargaining, e.g. by simply
ignoring collective agreements and agreeing on firm-specific terms with the works council.
Whereas such a behavior in the 1980s has called forth vigorous protest from unions and
legal action, nowadays there seems to be a tacit agreement for toleration, indicating that
the collective bargaining system as such is under serious pressure also in West Germany.
For details see Soltwedel (1997).
3
2 Deutsches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Institut fiir Weitwirtschaft an der
University Kiel, Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (1997: 11).14
westfyet now it was possible to have a look of their own. And the leitmotiv
wasi ;;Kommt die D-Mark nicht nach hier, fahren wir zu ihr".
3
3 Initially, about
60 000 people left the GDR in a hurry. In 1989 as well as in 1990, East
Germany lost about 5 per cent of its population (table 6).
However, after it became a certainty that unification would come and that
swift improvement of living conditions could be expected, the political motive,
i.e. the anxiety that the door would be open only for a short period of time, net-
migration decreased markedly. Furthermore, living standards of the East
German population have improved significantly since unification (table 2). Net
wages and salaries per employee, to which it is often referred to as a measure
for improvement, have risen from 55 p.c. of the west German level in 1991 to
85 p.c. in 1996.
3
4
Outmigration from as well as immigration to East Germany seem to have
stabilized since the mid-1990s at a low level. Five arguments may explain these
developments.
First, after the removal of the borders many emigrated from East Germany to
West Germany because of the chance that was given to them for which they
may have been looking for long, whether for political or for economic reasons.
Second, because of the ,,big bang" with a ,,rich brother" east Germans
received transfers from West Germany which meant in general, that they were
significantly better off then before in absolute terms and relative to west
Germans, keeping them from moving to the west.
Third, west Germans migrated to East Germany either to seize new
3
1 ,,lf the D-Mark does not come to us, we'll go where it is". See Watrin (1998). The gist of
the Zeitgeist is revealed by a cartoon on the frontpage of the International Herald Tribune
in the week after the wall was torn down in Berlin: The cartoon displayed the head of Mr.
Krentz. the successor to Mr. Honecker as Secretary General of the Socialist Party of the
German Democratic Republic, behind him masses and masses of people queuing up until
the horizon, with Mr. Krentz saying: ,,We'll bury you".
3
4 Net wages and salaries relative to the level in West Germany have increased significantly
faster than gross wages and salaries due e.g. to the lower absolute wages in combination
with the progressively of the tax system or to legally determined lower contributions to the
social security system. At the same time, per capita GDP, which is the most meaningful
indication, while also rising rapidly in comparison with the level in the west, has improved
less because of the strong decline in employment: As this decline results to a large degree
from wage and salary increases, GDP per capita presumably would be higher with lower
wages and salaries, but more employment in turn.15
opportunities which had opened up for private persons there or to built up
administrations (sent by the western governments and administrations, though
on a voluntary basis for the officers).
Fourth, east Germans may have been disappointed and returned to East
Germany
35.
Fifth, with the continued relatively poor performance of the West German
economy since the recession in 1993 and the increase of unemployment, east
Germans may have been prevented from migrating to the west. For what reason
ever, apparently the expectation was wrong that East Germany would suffer a
continued loss of population due to (net) migration to West Germany because of
higher living standards there.
VI. The Threat of Migration - Can It Be Contained in Unified
Korea?
The question whether the threat of migration can be retained in the case of
Korea is dependent upon time in the first place: If there would be a collapse of
the political regime in North Korea, unification could come over night, as was
the case in Germany. In such a scenario the threat of a migration deluge may
have some probability, although it is open to doubt whether the North Korean
citizens have the appropriate knowledge ( orexpectation or merely hope) of the
tremendous wealth gap.
However, if the would be time for convening with the north on something that
could come close to the European single common market program, with
monetary policy in the north being firmly anchored via, e.g. a currency board
system, to the Won, a binding self-commitment to structural reforms could help
bringing the beneficial effects about trade theory is talking about.
From this it follows that the credibility of the reform process and its efficacy
for improving systemically the institutions of the social and economic order is a
necessary condition for trying to contain the threat of migration. What could
South Korea do to increase this credibility? To better be able to answer this
3
5 This is a mere speculation, as figures do not exist which would allow to discriminate
between previously east Germans and west Germans among the migrants to East Germany.16
question we should consider what type of consequences South Korea would
have to face if the reform process would give impetus to the reconstruction
process in North Korea and, hopefully, to a process of self-sustaining growth.
Income converge could result even without migration of people with
..migration" of products, hence increasing division of labor by the Heckscher-
Ohlin process of specialization and the resulting trade pattern. South Korea
would in this case witness intensified competition via trade in Heckscher-Ohlin
products, i.e. labor intensive goods. To render credibility to the reform process
South Korea should refrain from protectionist reactions to the heightened
competitive pressures. In particular it should refrain from impairing the
competitiveness of North Korean producers by raising the competitors costs e.g.
by a relatively high appreciation due to a high rate of conversion when
introducing the Won into North Korea, or by urging for a quick convergenpe of
wages despite broad productivity differentials or by subsidizing labor-intensive
production in South Korea.
Credibility that reforms in North Korea will stimulate the take-off of the
economy can thus be reassured by South Korea if the heightened pressure for
structural change in South Korea is accepted and that the institutional
framework within South Korea is changed to give incentive to speeding up the
process of structural adjustment. Hence, in order to discourage the migration of
people, the ,,migration" of goods must be accepted and the resulting effects that
increased trade has on the South Korean economy.
Furthermore, South Korea will also witness the ..migration" of capital: If a
consistent pattern of reform measures is implemented in North Korea and
factor-prices correspond to the relative scarcities, the number of profitable
investment possibilities will increase. Just assume risk away and - for the sake
of argument - accept the premise of credibility, capital will flow into North
Korea, thereby raising the real rate of interest also for South Korea. In order to
cope with the heightened real rate of interest investment possibilities in South
Korea must prove to meet the heightened profitability requirement. From this it
follows that profitability of investment must increase in South Korea. How
could this be secured? The standard answer is ,,by speeding up structural
change, by getting rid of x-inefficiencies through stronger exposure to
competition, by increasing the flexibility of the economy through structural17
(institutional) reforms.
The threat of migration can only be contained if the adjustment pressure on
the South Korean economy, which will inevitably increase because of
integration, is accepted and responded to appropriately. Since unification will
change the relative factor prices also in South Korea: the relative price of labor
will decline and, correspondingly, the cost of capital will increase.
Structural adjustment takes time. For that reason the initial migration pressure
may in fact induce factual migration because of the lacking credibility that the
future will really bring improvement. Since structural adjustment for actually
making headway requires appropriate guidance from a clear incentive structure,
South Korea may want to reassure investors and potential migrants alike by
consequently and consistently putting their institutional and legal framework
under scrutiny and by the self-commitment improve the capacity to adjust by
structural reform. The South Korean government may want to consider that the
OECD peer pressure review process provides a good opportunity to benefit
from the experiences in structural reform in other member countries.
A step toward avoiding rural-urban migration is to nurture the perspective of
doing a living on their own land. Land reform and efficient credit institutions
for building up the agricultural system are likewise important. To this end it
might be helpful to give incentive for specialized banking institutions such as
the Raiffaisen-banks in Germany that did a lot to develop farming. In order to
realize scale economics it might be useful to establish cooperatives of owner-
entrepreneurs.18
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt: Fachserie 1: Gebiet und Bevolkerung. Reihe 1: Bevolkerung und Erwerbstatigkeic. Stuttgart, various
Statistisches Jahrbuch. Stuttgart, various issues; Statistisches Bundesamt. Wirtschaft und Statistik. Nr. 12, Dezember 1997.20
Table 2 - East Germany and West Germany in Comparison 1991-1996
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Gross labour income per employee. —
 b Manufacturing, Energy, Watersupplies,
Construction.-
c Gross value added at current prices per employed person. — Gross labour
per employee divided by gross value added per employee
average. — 'Gross domestic product
person. —-' Gross fixed capital





















entrepreneurial and property income as a percentage of net fixed capital at repurchasing prices.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 18, Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Reihe 1.3,
Konten und Standardtabellen. - Alfred Boss et. al., Aufschwung in Deutschland: Mehr Schub
von der Inlandsnachfrage. Die Weltwirtschaft 1996, Heft 4.21
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt. Zur wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Lage in den neuen
Bundeslandern. VierteljahreszeHschrift. Dezember 1994. Wiesbaden, 1994. - Bundesanstall
fur Arbeit, Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt fiir Arbeit. - IAB. Aktuelle Daten vom
Arbeitsmarkt.22
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institutions. Insurance companies. Other services. —
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Zur wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Lage in den neuen
Bundeslandern. Vierteljahreszeitschrift. Dezember 1994. Wiesbaden. 1994. Statistisches
Bundesamt, Fachserie 18: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Reihe 1.3: Konten und
Standardtabellen. Hauptbericht 1996.23
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt. Zur wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Lage in den neuen Landern.
Sonderausgabe, Dezember 1992; Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie I, Bevolkerung und
Erwerbstatigkeit. Reihe 4.1.1 Stand und Entwicklung der Erwerbstiitigkeit (Ergehnisse des
Mikrozensus), 1995 und 199624









































































































































































































































































Source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany,
Bundeslandern", 6/97.
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